On 18 May 1999, a
bi-partisan group of members of the U.S. House of Representatives,
including Majority Whip Tom Delay (R-TX), Christopher Cox (R-CA),
Peter Deutsch (D-FL), Robert Andrews (D-NJ) and Nita Lowey (D-NY) and
introduced H.R-1838.
It is the
House-version of the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act, which was
introduced in the U.S. Senate on 24 March 1999 by Senators Robert
Torricelli (D-NJ) and Jesse Helms (R-NC). The text of the House Act is
as follows:
H.R.1838Taiwan Security Enhancement Act
106th CONGRESS1st SessionIN
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATESMay
18, 1999
A BILL
To assist in the enhancement of the security of Taiwan, and for
other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the `Taiwan Security Enhancement Act'.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:
- Since 1949, the close relationship between the United States and
Taiwan has been of enormous benefit to both societies.
- In recent years, Taiwan has undergone a major political
transformation, and Taiwan is today a true multiparty democracy with
a political system separate from and totally unlike that of the
People's Republic of China.
- The economy of Taiwan is based upon free market
principles and is separate and distinct from the People's Republic
of China.
- Although on January 1, 1979, the United States Government
withdrew diplomatic recognition of the government on Taiwan as the
legitimate government of China, neither at that time nor since has
the United States Government adopted a formal position as to the
ultimate status of Taiwan other than to state that status must be
decided by peaceful means. Any determination of the ultimate status
of Taiwan must have the express consent of the people on Taiwan.
- The government on Taiwan no longer claims to be the sole
legitimate government of all of China.
- The Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-8) states that--
- (A) peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait area are in the
political, security, and economic interests of the United States
and are of international concern;
- (B) the decision of the United States to establish diplomatic
relations with the People's Republic of China rests upon the
expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined
by peaceful means;
- (C) the United States would consider any effort to determine
the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means,
including boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and
security of the Western Pacific region and of grave concern to
the United States;
- (D) the United States will maintain the capacity to resist
any form of coercion that jeopardizes the security, or the
social or the economic system, of the people on Taiwan ;
and
- (E) the preservation and enhancement of the human rights of
all the people on Taiwan are objectives of the United
States.
- On the basis of these provisions, the Taiwan Relations
Act establishes on the part of the United States a continuing
connection with and concern for Taiwan , its people, and
their ability to maintain themselves free of coercion and free of
the use of force against them. The maintenance by Taiwan of
forces adequate for defense and deterrence is in the interest of the
United States in that it helps to maintain peace in the Taiwan
Strait area.
- Since 1954, when the United States and Taiwan signed the
Mutual Defense Treaty, the United States and Taiwan have
maintained a defense and security relationship that has contributed
greatly to freedom, peace, and stability in Taiwan and the East Asia
and Pacific regions.
- The United States and Taiwan no longer conduct joint training
missions, have no direct military lines of communication, and have
only limited military-to-military contacts. This lack of
communication and interoperation between the United States and
Taiwan hinders planning for the defense of Taiwan and could prove
detrimental in the event of future aggression against Taiwan.
- Since 1979, the United States has continued to sell defensive
weapons to Taiwan in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act, and
such sales have helped Taiwan maintain its autonomy and freedom in
the face of persistent hostility from the People's Republic of
China. However, pressures to delay, deny, and reduce arms sales to
Taiwan have been prevalent since the signing of the August 17, 1982,
communique with the People's Republic of China. Over time, such
delays, denials, and reductions could prevent Taiwan from
maintaining a sufficient capability for self-defense.
- As has been affirmed on several occasions by the executive branch
of Government, the provisions of the Taiwan Relations Act take legal
precedence over any communique with the People's Republic of China.
- The People's Republic of China has consistently refused to
renounce the use of force against Taiwan and has repeatedly
threatened force against Taiwan, including implied threats by
unnamed People's Republic of China officials on January 10, 1999,
who warned Taiwan not to participate in the development of theater
missile defense capabilities with the United States.
- The missile firings by the People's Republic of China near Taiwan
in August 1995 and March 1996 clearly demonstrate the willingness of
the People's Republic of China to use forceful tactics to limit the
freedom of the people on Taiwan.
- As most nations in East Asia reduce military spending, the
People's Republic of China continues a major and comprehensive
military buildup.
- This military buildup includes the development of advanced
ballistic and cruise missiles that will incorporate precision
guidance capability and the construction of new imaging, radar,
navigation, and electronic intelligence satellites that will help
target and guide ballistic and cruise missiles. According to the
Department of Defense report entitled `The Security Situation in the
Taiwan Strait', submitted to Congress in February 1999, the size of
the missile force of the People's Republic of China is expected to
grow substantially and, by 2005, the People's Republic of China will
possess an `overwhelming advantage' in offensive missiles vis-a-vis
Taiwan. The Department of Defense has also noted that the People's
Republic of China may already possess the capability to damage
satellite optical sensors with lasers, is researching advanced
anti-satellite lasers that could blind United States intelligence
satellites, and is procuring radio frequency weapons that disable
electronic equipment. These missile and anti-satellite capabilities
pose a grave threat to Taiwan.
- This military buildup also includes the construction or
procurement from abroad of advanced naval systems, including Russian
Kilo submarines that are difficult to detect, Russian technology to
assist the development of new nuclear-powered attack submarines,
Russian Sovremenny class destroyers armed with supersonic SS-N-22
Sunburn anti-ship missiles, a new long-range, all-weather naval
attack aircraft called the JH-7, and new indigenous land-attack
cruise missiles that could be launched from submarines, ships, and
naval attack aircraft. These naval capabilities pose a grave threat
of blockade to Taiwan.
- This military buildup also includes the improvement of air combat
capabilities by procuring and co-producing hundreds of Russian
Sukhoi Su-27 fighters, seeking to purchase Russian Su-30 all-weather
attack aircraft, arming these aircraft with advanced air-to-air
missiles such as the Russian R-77 missile and other precision guided
munitions, constructing the indigenously designed J-10 fighter, and
seeking advanced airborne warning and control systems from abroad.
These capabilities pose a grave airborne threat to Taiwan.
- Because of the introduction of advanced submarines into the
Taiwan Strait area by the People's Republic of China and the
increasing capability of the People's Republic of China to blockade
Taiwan, Taiwan needs to acquire diesel-powered submarines in order
to maintain a capability to counter a blockade, to conduct
antisubmarine warfare training, and for other purposes.
- Because of the democratic form of government on Taiwan and the
historically nonaggressive foreign policy of Taiwan, it is highly
unlikely that Taiwan would use submarines in an offensive manner.
- The current defense relationship between the United States and
Taiwan is deficient in terms of its capacity over the long term to
counter and deter potential aggression against Taiwan by the
People's Republic of China.
SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.
It is the sense of Congress that--
- (1) the Secretary of Defense and the Secretaries of the military
departments should make every effort to reserve additional positions
for Taiwan officers at the National Defense University, the senior
war colleges, and the military academies; and
- (2) the Secretary of State should, when considering foreign
military sales to Taiwan--
- (A) take into account the special status of Taiwan; and
- (B) make every effort to ensure that Taiwan has full and
timely access to price and availability data for defense
articles and defense services.
SEC. 4. DETERMINATIONS OF DEFENSE NEEDS OF TAIWAN.
- (a) INCREASE IN TECHNICAL STAFF OF THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE IN
TAIWAN- Upon the request of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency,
the President shall use funds available to the Department of Defense
under the Arms Export Control Act for the assignment or detail of
additional technical staff to the American Institute in Taiwan.
- (b) ANNUAL REPORTS- Beginning 60 days after the next round of
arms talks between the United States and Taiwan, and annually
thereafter, the President shall submit a report to Congress--
- (1) detailing each of Taiwan's requests for purchase of
defense articles and defense services during the one-year period
ending on the date of the report;
- (2) describing the defense needs asserted by Taiwan as
justification for those requests; and
- (3) describing any decision to reject, postpone, or modify
any such request that was made during the one-year period ending
on the date of the report, the level at which the final decision
was made, and a justification for the decision.
SEC. 5. STRENGTHENING THE DEFENSE OF TAIWAN.
- (a) MAINTENANCE OF SUFFICIENT SELF-DEFENSE CAPABILITIES OF
TAIWAN- Congress finds that any determination of the nature or
quantity of defense articles or defense services to be made
available to Taiwan that is made on any basis other than the defense
needs of Taiwan, whether pursuant to the August 17, 1982, Communique
signed with the People's Republic of China, or any similar executive
agreement, order, or policy would violate the intent of Congress in
the enactment of section 3(b) of the Taiwan Relations Act (22 U.S.C.
3302(b)).
- (b) PLAN-
- (1) IN GENERAL- The Secretary of Defense, in consultation
with the Secretary of State, shall develop a plan for the
enhancement of programs and arrangements for operational
training and exchanges of personnel between the armed forces of
the United States and Taiwan for work in threat analysis,
doctrine, force planning, operational methods, and other areas.
The plan shall provide for exchanges of officers up to and
including general and flag officers in the grade of O-10.
- (2) REPORT- Not later than 180 days after the date of
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit a
report to Congress, in classified or unclassified form,
containing the plan required under paragraph (1).
- (3) IMPLEMENTATION- Not later than 30 days after the date on
which the report described in paragraph (2) is submitted or
required to be submitted, the Secretary of Defense shall
implement the plan contained in the report.
- (c) COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND TAIWAN MILITARY
COMMANDS- Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of
this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall establish secure direct
communications between the United States Pacific military command
and the Taiwan military command.
- (d) MISSILE DEFENSE EQUIPMENT- Subject to subsection (h), the
President is authorized to make available for sale to Taiwan, at
reasonable cost, theater missile defense equipment and related
items, including--
- (1) ground-based and naval-based missile defense systems; and
- (2) reconnaissance and communications systems, as may be
necessary to target and cue missile defense systems sold to
Taiwan.
- (e) SATELLITE EARLY WARNING DATA- Subject to subsection (h), the
President is authorized to make available for sale to Taiwan, at
reasonable cost, satellite early warning data.
- (f) AIR DEFENSE EQUIPMENT- Subject to subsection (h), the
President is authorized to make available for sale to Taiwan, at
reasonable cost, modern air-defense equipment, including the
following:
- (1) AIM-120 AMRAAM air-to-air missiles.
- (2) Additional advanced fighters and airborne warning and
control systems (AWACS).
- (3) Equipment to better defend airfields from air and missile
attack.
- (4) Communications infrastructure that enables coordinated
joint-force air defense of Taiwan.
- (g) NAVAL DEFENSE SYSTEMS- Subject to subsection (h), the
President is authorized to make available for sale to Taiwan, at
reasonable cost, defensive systems that counter the development by
the People's Republic of China of new naval capabilities, including
defense systems such as--
- (1) diesel-powered submarines;
- (2) anti-submarine systems, including airborne systems,
capable of detecting new Kilo and advanced Chinese nuclear
submarines;
- (3) naval anti-missile systems, including Aegis destroyers,
capable of defeating Russian supersonic anti-ship missiles; and
- (4) communications systems that better enable Taiwan to
conduct joint-force naval defense operations.
- (h) RELATION TO ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT- Nothing in this section
supersedes or modifies the application of section 36 of the Arms
Export Control Act to the sale of any defense article or defense
service under this section.
END
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