The United States Role in the Taiwan
Straits Issue
by Richard Bush
By virtue of its title alone, "Building
New Bridges for a New Millennium," -- this conference
looks forward. Yet to contemplate the future role of the
United States concerning the Taiwan Strait issue, it is
necessary to have some understanding of the past and present.
Ambassador Lord has provided the former and I will offer the
latter, to help provide a framework for discussion. The United
States role in the Taiwan Strait issue can be defined by five
key principles.
First of all, the United States has
insisted and will insist that the Taiwan Strait issue be
resolved peacefully. The Administration remains firmly
committed to President Carter's statement to this effect in
December 1978 and to the elaborations made in the Taiwan
Relations Act, as follows:
- That hostile action against Taiwan would be regarded by
the United States as a threat to the peace and security of
the Western Pacific and a matter of grave concern to the
United States;
- That the United States should maintain the capacity to
resist such hostile action;
- That the President and the Congress would consult and
take appropriate action in response to any threat to
Taiwan's security and danger to U.S. interests; and
- That the United States should provide defense articles
and services necessary for Taiwan to maintain a sufficient
ability to defend itself.
It was in part to re-emphasize the US
insistence on resolving the Taiwan Strait issue peacefully
that President Clinton sent two carrier battle groups to the
Taiwan area in March of 1996, and that both Houses of Congress
reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to the TRA in July of this
year. This is a point on which the Executive Branch, the
Congress, the media, and the American public agree.
The second principle that governs the
Administration approach is that constructive and meaningful
cross-Strait dialogue is the best way to resolve Taiwan-PRC
differences. In and of itself, dialogue fosters an atmosphere
in which tensions are reduced, misperceptions can be
clarified, and common ground can be explored. One of the most
salutary developments in East Asia during the early 1990s was
the beginning of a dialogue between Taiwan's Straits Exchange
Foundation (SEF) and the mainland's Association for Relations
Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS). Cancellation of the dialogue
in July 1995 aggravated the tensions of the time, for it
closed off a channel of communication. Now, with the
encouragement of the United States, the two sides have resumed
dialogue through the visit of Dr. Ku Chen-fu, chairman of SEF,
to Shanghai and Beijing in October.
The Administration is pleased with the
achievements of Dr. Ku's visit and the seriousness with which
it was conducted. The atmosphere between the two sides is much
improved and they reached a four-point consensus for future
cooperation. For example, Mr. Wang Daohan, the ARATS chairman,
will visit Taiwan. We welcome these developments and the
meetings, contacts, and exchanges that are to follow.
The third principle governing the U.S.
role in the Taiwan Strait issue is that the issues that divide
Beijing and Taipei -- substantive and otherwise -- should be
resolved by the two sides themselves. Whereas the United
States has played a central role in trying to end conflicts in
the Middle East, Northern Ireland, and Cyprus, in this case
our interests in peace and stability are best served by not
taking a seat at the table. Indeed, it has been a matter of
U.S. policy since 1982 that we would not seek to mediate this
dispute.
Why is this the case? In the first place, the
United States has some experience in mediating disputes
between these two parties. In the late 1940s, in a vain
attempt to head off civil war in China, General George
Marshall undertook an effort to bring peace between the
Communist and Nationalist parties. That effort failed because
neither side possessed the political will to coexist with the
other, and because each side believed that Marshall had sided
with the other. Of course, circumstances today are very
different, but the Marshall mission remains a useful
historical lesson on the dangers of good but naive intentions.
Second, the test of any negotiated settlement
is the commitment of the parties directly concerned to abide
by it. That commitment is likely to be higher for a settlement
that the parties themselves have negotiated, and less in a
case where a mediator is involved and can be blamed for the
compliance failures of the other. To be concrete, any
arrangements achieved by Beijing and Taipei alone are more
likely to endure than those facilitated by an American
go-between.
Similarly, and this is my fourth principle,
the United States will remain even-handed in its approach to
cross-Strait dialogue. We will neither support one side over
the other, nor pressure one side to make concessions that it
does not wish to make. As a matter of fact, it has been U.S.
policy over a long period of time that we will not pressure
Taipei to negotiate with Beijing. That is a policy that the
Administration takes very seriously. But it applies equally to
Beijing.
Now I am well aware that there are people who
say that U.S. policy is not evenhanded and that the
President's visit to the PRC in June constituted pressure on
Taiwan to negotiate when it did not want to. President
Clinton-- the same President Clinton who sent two carrier
battle groups to the Taiwan area in March 1996 -- did not
intend to either change U.S. policy toward Taiwan or harm
Taiwan's interests during the summit. Nor was that the result
of his statements. That is true for at least three reasons.
First of all, the three statements of
President Clinton that have drawn attention (that the United
States does not support two Chinas or one China/one Taiwan,
does not support independence for Taiwan, and does not support
Taiwan's membership in organizations for which statehood is a
requirement) are by no means new. These statements are in fact
corollaries of our one-China policy, and have been operative
for years, the first two since 1971.
Second, these three points are not the sum
total of our policy toward Taiwan. Together, they are one of
several elements of our Taiwan policy; among the others are
the Taiwan Relations Act, the insistence on peaceful
resolution, and so on. Each element was part of our policy
before the June summit and each is in place after the summit.
They are, moreover, our policy, not what Beijing wants our
policy to be.
Third, the Clinton Administration, like its
predecessors, does not believe that our relations with Taipei
and Beijing are a zero-sum game. The historical record
suggests that when U.S.-PRC relations are good, cross-Strait
relations and U.S. ties with Taiwan are good as well. In the
context of the two summits, for example, the United States has
moved forward with Taiwan on its accession to the World Trade
Organization, and Secretary of Energy Richardson made a
well-received visit to Taipei last month. After President
Clinton's visit to the PRC, Taipei went forward with Dr. Ku's
visit to the mainland primarily because it believed that it
was in the island's best interest and because of confidence in
the United States.
Now some critics will acknowledge on the one
hand that the Clinton Administration does not pressure Taipei
directly, but then charge on the other that it is deviously
working through former officials. Thus it is still asserted
that William Perry was carrying a U.S. message when he
traveled to Taipei in January of this year, and that Joseph
Nye's March 8th op-ed in the Washington Post reflected the
Administration's views. These allegations are simply
speculation without foundation. These gentlemen were
expressing their views as private individuals.
My fifth principle is a corollary of
the fourth. Part of the Administration's approach of
evenhandedness is a belief that any arrangements concluded
between Beijing and Taipei should be on a mutually acceptable
basis. In any successful negotiation, in fact, each party
should believe that its fundamental interests have been
protected and that it is better off because of the bargaining
that has taken place. Also, as a corollary of this principle
of mutual acceptability. the Administration understands that
because Taiwan is a democracy, any results of cross-Strait
dialogue will have to have broad public support.
There are some who believe that democracy on
Taiwan is an obstacle to peace across the Strait. I disagree
with them. Taiwan's democracy, the emergence
of which the United States strongly supported, contributes
to peace and stability. The results of cross-Strait
dialogue must meet with the Taiwan public's approval, but any
result that enjoys broad support will be more lasting as a
result. In the meantime, I believe that the people on Taiwan
are wise and prudent enough to support responsible approaches
regarding Taiwan's future. And, by the way, Taiwan's
democratization -- one of the most remarkable examples of
political progress in our time -- serves as useful reference
for political liberalization in the PRC.
So these are my five principles on the United
States role in the Taiwan Strait issue:
- The United States insists that the Taiwan Strait issue be
resolved peacefully.
- The Administration believes that constructive and
meaningful dialogue is the best way to resolve cross-Strait
differences.
- It believes that these differences should be resolved by
the two sides themselves.
- The United States will remain even-handed in its approach
to cross-Strait dialogue, and not apply pressure to either
side.
- The Administration believes that any arrangements
concluded between Beijing and Taipei should be on a mutually
acceptable basis.
What is striking about these elements is that
they are not new. Most have been around decades and the others
were added to take account of the changes that have taken
place in Taiwan and between Taiwan and the PRC since 1986.
Moreover, they are consistent with the fundamental policy
approach of six Administrations: to foster an environment in
East Asia in which the all the parties concerned can take
advantage of the opportunities for cooperation and remove the
roots of conflict.
The Clinton Administration, like its
predecessors, has pursued this context-creating approach in a
variety of ways: forward deployment of our military forces,
alliances with five Pacific partners, promotion of global
economic liberalization, good substantive relations with
Taiwan, engagement with the People's Republic of China, and a
willingness to be a stabilizing force when necessary. The
results on Taiwan alone have been impressive: spectacular
democratic progress, continued security, and movement toward a
durable peace and increased cooperation across the Taiwan
Strait. In East Asia as a whole, regional peace and security
-- the central objectives of US policy -- have been enhanced.
In the spirit of this fundamental policy, the
United States will follow the development of cross-Strait
relations in the months ahead, in the hope that they will
develop in a constructive and substantive manner and lead to a
reduction of tensions and greater stability in the region. At
the same time, we understand that this is only the beginning
of a long process in which fundamental differences will be
addressed and that the results must meet with the
Taiwan public's approval.
And we have confidence that the two sides, with
the proper political will, have the wisdom and creativity to
craft arrangements that are consistent with their mutual
interests and that will command public support. Having helped
create the environment in which cross-Strait relations are
improving, and assuming that peaceful means are followed, the
United States monitor developments closely as an interested
observer.