



# Taiwan Communiqué

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# 145

## New tensions in South China Sea *China issues regulations restricting fisheries*

In the previous issue of *Taiwan Communiqué* we summarized the developments in the East China Sea, where Beijing declared a controversial Air Defense Identification Zone in November 2013 (*Senkaku tensions rise again, Communiqué* no. 144). Tensions in that area rose further in January 2014, when China's Defense Ministry stated that it had begun issuing warnings to foreign military aircraft flying through the zone.

Tensions in the South China Sea also rose in early 2014, when it was announced in Beijing that as of January 1<sup>st</sup>, foreign fishing vessels would be required to obtain a permit to conduct fishing operations in the waters that Beijing considers under jurisdiction of Hainan Province, which reportedly covers approximately 2/3 of the whole South China Sea.

According to the regulations, any ships violating the new rules would be forced out of the zone, have their catch confiscated, and face fines of up to the equivalent of US\$82,600. News reports from

Map: VOA News



Conflicting claims by countries bordering on the South China Sea

Vietnam indicated that already on January 3<sup>rd</sup>, a Vietnamese fishing vessel was stopped by a Chinese maritime patrol boat, and that Chinese officials boarded the vessel, using tasers and batons to subdue the fishermen, while the 5-ton catch was confiscated.

The move is reportedly designed to bolster Chinese territorial claims in the South China Sea, and gradually force other countries in the region to accept Chinese control over the territory. Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei and Taiwan have overlapping claims to a number of islands in the territory and their surrounding waters.

Press reports in late January 2014 indicated that China was basing a 5,000 ton patrol ship on Woody Island in the Paracel Archipelago, right in the middle of the disputed area. Reports from Beijing also said that Chinese ships were patrolling James Shoal (Zengmu Shoal) an area close to the shore of Sarawak also claimed by Taiwan and Malaysia. The area is about 1,800 km (1,120 miles) south of China's Hainan island. The Chinese reports stated that soldiers and officers on board "swore to safeguard China's sovereignty over the disputed islands."

## ***Strong response from the US and other nations***

Immediately after the new Chinese rules were announcement, the US expressed its strong opposition: on 9 January 2014, State Department spokeswoman Jen Psaki stated: *The passing of these restrictions on other countries' fishing activities in disputed portions of the South China Sea is a provocative and potentially dangerous act. She added: China has not offered any explanation or basis under international law for these extensive maritime claims.*



Copyright: Taipei Times

**President Ma Ying-jeou on the Chinese Air Defense Identification Zone: *Here kitty, kitty. Meow ...***

Vietnam and the Philippines also criticized the new rules. Philippines' foreign ministry spokesperson Raul Hernandez stated on 10 January that *(t)hese regulations seriously violate the freedom of navigation and the right to fish of all states in the high seas.*

While in November 2013 the response from the Taiwan government to the earlier declaration of an ADIZ zone in the East China Sea by China had been rather weak, this time Taipei had a slightly firmer response to the new Chinese claims. The foreign ministry in Taipei rejected the Chinese rules and said it does not recognize Beijing's right to order foreign fishing boats to seek approval before operating in the area.

On 8 January 2014, the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC), the Taiwan body in charge of relations with China, also expressed its strong opposition. It said that *Taiwan does not recognize regulations unilaterally announced by China over territories it claims in the South China Sea.*

### ***Danny Russel: an incremental pattern of assertiveness***

Photo: Department of State

In early February 2014, news reports started to come out that China was also planning an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) for the *South China Sea*, like it had done for the *East China Sea* in November 2013.

This move prompted even stronger responses from the US and other nations with an interest in the region. In back-to-back statements on 4 and 5 February 2014, US Assistant Secretary of State **Danny Russel**, and the senior director at the US National Security Council **Evan Medeiros**, issued warnings to China, strongly urging it to rescind the declaration on the East China Sea ADIZ and not to move forward with the new fisheries regulations or a new ADIZ in the South China Sea.



**Assistant Secretary of State  
Daniel R. Russel**

At a 4 February 2014 press conference at the Washington Foreign Press Center, Assistant Secretary Russel stated in a prepared statement: *The United States is concerned by a range of developments in the East China Sea and in the South China Sea, particularly actions that are unilateral, actions that are a provocative assertion of claims in non-diplomatic, non-legal ways. That kind of activity raises questions about commitment to the rule of law. It raises questions about long-term objectives of some of the countries in the region.*

When during the Q&A Mr. Russel was asked about the Chinese moves in the East and South China Seas, he stated *We made clear at the time – and we continue to reinforce*

*the point – that we do not recognize that (East China Sea) ADIZ. .... We think, in honesty, that this was a move that is not consistent with regional stability. We consider this a move that raises tensions at a time when those tensions should be reduced. We see it as a move that increases, not decreases the risk of miscalculation or of confrontation or of accidents.*

Later on, during the Q&A, Mr. Russel also stated that ... *we have expressed our concern regarding these new regulations, as well as **an incremental pattern of assertiveness** that is cause for concern by China's friends and by China's neighbors.*

On the same day, senior director Evan Medeiros was quoted by Kyodo News Service as saying that Washington thinks that Beijing set up the East China Sea ADIZ *to try and bolster its claims to disputed territories.* He stated that *We do not accept, we do not acknowledge, we do not recognize China's declared ADIZ* and urged China to refrain from declaring such an ADIZ in the South China Sea, warning that that *could lead the US military to change its posture in the region.*

On the next day, 5 February 2014, at a hearing before the **House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific**, Assistant Secretary Russel reiterated the US position on the East and South China Sea with the following words:

*China's announcement of an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the East China Sea in November was a provocative act and a serious step in the wrong direction. The Senkakus are under the administration of Japan and unilateral attempts to change the status quo raise tensions and do nothing under international law to strengthen territorial claims. The United States neither recognizes nor accepts China's declared East China Sea ADIZ and has no intention of changing how we conduct operations in the region. China should not attempt to implement the ADIZ and should refrain from taking similar actions elsewhere in the region.*

Later on in his statement, Mr. Russel said: *There is a growing concern that this pattern of behavior in the South China Sea reflects an incremental effort by China to assert control over the area contained in the so-called "nine-dash line," despite the objections of its neighbors and despite the lack of any explanation or apparent basis under international law regarding the scope of the claim itself. China's lack of clarity with regard to its South China Sea claims has created uncertainty, insecurity and instability in the region. It limits the prospect for achieving a mutually agreeable resolution or equitable joint development arrangements among the claimants.*

*I want to reinforce the point that under international law, maritime claims in the South China Sea must be derived from land features. Any use of the “nine dash line” by China to claim maritime rights not based on claimed land features would be inconsistent with international law. The international community would welcome China to clarify or adjust its nine-dash line claim to bring it in accordance with the international law of the sea.*

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## **The DPP issues its China policy report**

### *Sticking to principles, but with more flexibility*

On 9 January 2014, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) unveiled its long-awaited China policy in Taipei. The document was the end result of a lengthy consultation process, in which the party’s China Affairs Commission convened nine meetings at which about 630 participants — party officials, civic groups, academics and experts — presented their views and insights.

Photo: Taipei Times

The party left its 1999 *Party Resolution on Taiwan’s Future* unchanged. This states that Taiwan is already an independent country, and that any change in the country’s “status quo” can only be made by the people of Taiwan by means of a plebiscite.

The document states that cross-strait interaction with China is to be welcomed, but emphasizes that it needs to be done in a transparent fashion, that it must not undermine Taiwan’s sovereignty and security and that it needs to encompass promotion of freedom, democracy and human rights.



**DPP Chairman Su Tseng-chang announcing the party's new China policy**

The policy document also outlines a strategy for improving Taiwan’s economic and industrial development, building on the country’s technological strengths. It decries the

erosion of the economy and imbalances introduced by the Chinese Nationalist Party's (KMT) overreliance on economic ties with China, and argues for a more balanced development of external trade relations through membership of the Trans-Pacific Partnership.

The document also highlights that Taiwan's free and open society is being threatened by what it refers to as the "China Factor": Through its economic power, China has begun to "*permeate Taiwanese society and gradually reshaped the free and open way of life that the people of Taiwan have enjoyed, subtly but tangibly restricting the range of political choice for Taiwanese voters.*"

Last but not least, the document outlines a more balanced national security strategy, which enhances the nation's international status and bolsters its national defense capabilities through "*values diplomacy*" (combining the universal values of freedom, democracy and human rights with Taiwan's accumulated experiences in good governance) and the buildup of asymmetric capabilities in its defense against China's military aggression.

Former US National Security Council director Michael Green, who hosted a seminar on the issue at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington DC, said that it is a comprehensive and reasonable approach that reflects that a lot of thinking has gone into it. He added that it represents a careful calibration that reflects sensitivity to US interests and concerns.

## ***Expected reactions from KMT and PRC***

Not unexpectedly, the reactions from the side of the Kuomintang and from the Chinese side were not so enthusiastic. While the Ma government or the ruling Kuomintang refrained from comment, newspapers associated with the Kuomintang criticized the report as "*conservative*" and "*inflexible.*"

Not to be left behind, in a statement issued on 10 January 2014, China's State Council's Taiwan Affairs Office director Zhang Zhijun accused the DPP of "*having a rigid mindset.*"

***Taiwan Communiqué comment:*** *It is of course interesting that the comments from the Kuomintang side reflects that the party is still clinging to an anachronistic "Republic of China" concept dating back to the heydays of Chiang Kai-shek's regime in China before 1949.*

*With the present exercise, the DPP is trying to find a way forward for Taiwan by establishing a basis for a consensus on the island on how to deal with a belligerent*

*neighbor that continues to threaten Taiwan's sovereignty and existence as a free and democratic nation.*


*And as far as the PRC reaction is concerned: Beijing will only be satisfied if the DPP discards Taiwan's hard-won freedom and democracy, and "return" to a fold of which it never was a part. Hardly a viable proposition!*

## ***Internal debate in the DPP***

The debate about its China policy also prompted some interesting dissonance in the DPP party itself. In one of the final meetings before publication of the policy paper, the DPP's legislative whip, Mr. Ker Chien-ming, suddenly proposed that the DPP should "freeze" the independence clause which is embedded in the *1999 Resolution on Taiwan's Future*.

Copyright: Taipei Times

Mr. Ker argued that putting the clause on ice would bring the party more votes, particularly from the center of Taiwan's political spectrum. He also said that it might make Beijing more amenable to holding talks with the DPP. Mr. Ker's proposals did not gain any traction within the DPP, and were broadly dismissed (see Mei-chin Chen "*DPP China policy no place for daydreams.*" *Taipei Times*, 8 January 2014).



***DPP: We might have to leave this guy behind if we're going to get anywhere...***

Ironically, Mr. Ker's views were praised by Beijing's Taiwan Affairs Office: On 27 December 2013, TAO's spokesperson Fan Liqing described Ker as "*a man of vision*" and his initiatives as "*a positive sign, as well as an important step in the right direction if the initiative is approved by the party.*"

Another moment of internal dissonance occurred right after the policy paper had been issued: on 15 January 2014 former DPP chairman and prime minister Frank Hsieh came out and criticized the report, saying that it had "*failed to make substantial progress in the DPP's relationship with Beijing*" and that the party should "*change its China policy as soon as possible.*"

The main reason for Hsieh's ire was apparently the fact that the party had not taken Hsieh's "two sides, two constitutions" proposals on board. These proposals are generally considered fuzzy and unworkable by many members of the DPP, but Hsieh is continuing to push them. Hsieh, who retired after his dismal loss in the 2008 presidential race, is reportedly also eyeing a political comeback. On 29 January 2014, he announced that he would run for party chairman in May of this year. Few give him much of a chance against current chairman Su Tseng-chang or former chairperson Tsai Ing-wen, who is reportedly also considering to run.

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## The Wang-Zhang meeting in Nanjing

### *First "official" meeting between the two sides*

On 11 February 2014, Messrs. Wang Yu-chi, the head of Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council (MAC), and Zhang Zhijun, who heads China's Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO), met in Nanjing, China. The meeting was billed as the first official government-to-government talks between the two sides. Until now, meetings were conducted through semi-official Straits Exchange Foundation (Taiwan) and Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (China).

Copyright: Taipei Times

The meeting was quite controversial in Taiwan, where many people saw it as a first step by the China-leaning Ma administration on the road to "political talks", which in turn would – in the perception of both the Ma government and Beijing – pave the way for "unification."



**"One China framework" needle popping the Ma administration's "1992 Consensus" balloon**

In fact, with the support of Kuomintang legislators, the Legislative Yuan on 14 January 2014 adopted a resolution on Mr. Wang Yu-chi's trip to China, stipulating that he may not sign any document or issue a joint statement of any kind that accepts or echoes Beijing's claim of a "one China" framework or its opposition

to Taiwan independence. In the view of the people who drafted the resolution, these two Chinese claims endanger Taiwan's sovereignty.

According to newspaper reports from Taiwan, the Chinese side also imposed restrictions. The **United Daily News** reported that the Chinese side didn't want any talks on "*political matters, and no mention of terms such as freedom, democracy, rule of law or president.*" The paper said that the Chinese side also didn't want any reference to the "Republic of China."

Reportedly, the PRC is also putting pressure on the Ma government to accept a "*one China framework*" formulation, which goes beyond the "*1992 Consensus*" (one China, different interpretations) touted by the KMT administration in Taipei. Beijing considers the "1992 Consensus" too vague, and wants a stronger formula for moving towards the "unification" it wants to impose.

There was also much speculation in Taiwan whether a possible meeting between Taiwan's president Ma Ying-jeou and Chinese president Xi Jinping at the APEC summit in November 2014 would be discussed. Taiwan's Wang Yu-chi told a meeting of the Legislative Yuan that he "would not raise" the issue, leaving open the possibility for China to raise it.

But Beijing has been cool to the proposal, and certainly doesn't want it at the APEC leaders' summit, as it would imply that Mr. Ma is a leader of a nation, and Beijing only considers him a "local leader." Newsmedia reports on 14 February 2014 indicated that Beijing had rejected the proposal as "inappropriate."

## *Two journalists refused entry visa*

The February 11<sup>th</sup> Nanjing meeting was also overshadowed by the fact that two journalists from Taiwan who had applied to accompany the Taiwan delegation to China were refused an entry visa by the Beijing authorities. The journalists, from the Chinese-language Apple Daily and Radio Free Asia were turned down without any explanation.

The refusal was strongly criticized by the **Association of Taiwan Journalists** in Taipei. In a statement issued on 9 February 2014, the organization said: *China's unilateral restriction of reporters' access is a serious violation of the freedom of the press.* It urged the leader of Taiwan's delegation, minister Wang Yu-chi, to express the deepest regrets over the issue. However, reports from Nanjing indicated that Wang did not raise the issue.



that due to this fundamental shift “reunification” is now only possible for Beijing if it chooses to start a war. He argues for the US to express much stronger support for Taiwan, both in economic (TPP) and military terms (F-16 sale). He states that if the United States wants to avoid a conflict in the Taiwan Strait, “...it cannot allow its benign negligence of Taiwan to be interpreted as a lessening of US commitment to Taiwan’s security.”

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## The legacy of Cheng Nan-jung

Cheng Nan-jung (also referred to as Deng Nan-jung) was one of Taiwan’s foremost democracy pioneers. He was born in 1947, the years of the 228 massacre, the son of a mainlander father and a Taiwanese mother from Keelung. Growing up under the Kuomintang’s martial law, he became an ardent democracy and independence advocate.

Photo: Taipei Times

After graduating from college—he studied engineering at National Cheng Kung University in Tainan, and philosophy at Fu Jen Catholic University and National Taiwan University—he went into journalism and in 1984 became editor-in-chief of **Freedom Era Weekly**, which became one of the most important advocates of the end of martial law and Taiwan’s transition to democracy.



**Bust of Cheng Nan-jung at his memorial museum in Taipei**

He registered more than a dozen other magazine titles with the authorities, and when his publication was banned or confiscated, he used one of the other

“spare tires” to continue to publish. In 1986 he also set up the **519 Green Ribbon Movement**, which was instrumental in pushing for the end of Taiwan’s Martial law in July 1987.

At the end of 1988 he published an article in issue no. 254 of **Freedom Era Weekly** containing the full text of a proposed new Constitution for the Taiwan Republic. This prompted the Kuomintang authorities to charge him with “sedition” on 21 January 1989.

Police were sent to arrest him, but he barricaded himself in his office, and threatened to set it on fire if the authorities tried to break into his office. The standoff lasted for more

than two months, and eventually – in the early morning of 7 April 1989 – when heavily armed police and troops tried to storm the building, he set himself on fire and died.

## *University goes against student vote*

Cheng Nan-jung thus became a martyr for Taiwan’s democracy movement, and is seen by many Taiwanese as the spiritual father of freedom of the press in Taiwan, and for his “100% freedom of expression.”

Photo: Taipei Times

So when in November 2013 his alma mater, National Cheng Kung University, wanted to name a central square at the university, a student vote went overwhelmingly in favor of *Nan-jung Square*, after Deng’s first name, but also *South Banyan Square*, which has the same characters in Hanji.



**Students at National Cheng Kung University demonstrate in support of *Nan-jung Square***

However, on 2 January 2014, the president of the university, Hwung Hwung-hweng, wrote in an open letter to the faculty and student body that the name would be “*inappropriate*”, as the school needed to remain “... *politically and religiously neutral.*”

This was followed a couple of weeks later, on 15 January 2014, by a “vote” of a School Affairs Committee not to name the plaza at all. This prompted a widespread storm of protests against political manipulation and bias in the administration of the university. Many saw in it a resurgence of the authoritarian mindset and attitudes so prevalent during the Martial Law period (1949-1987).

## *Nan-jung’s widow and daughter speak out*

Mr. Deng’s widow, Yeh Chu-lan, and daughter Cheng Chu-mei also spoke out. Ms. Yeh, who served as deputy prime minister, presidential office secretary-general and mayor of Kaohsiung during the DPP administration of President Chen Shui-bian, said that “... *anti-*

*change, conservative forces in Taiwanese society have never gone away and have prevented democracy from taking root in the seemingly democratized nation.”*

Yeh was particularly infuriated by remarks of National Cheng Kung University history professor, Wang Wen-hsia, who had compared Deng to Islamic suicide bombers. Yeh said that it was tragic that a history professor had so little idea about the fact that someone had been willing to give their life in the pursuit of universal values such as democracy and freedom of expression. She said that those who teach history should have an accurate perception of the country’s historical events.

Yeh also expressed regret that the Taiwanese were living in such a polarized society, where there is such a deep gap between political visions for the future, and people are confronted with confusing national identities and inconsistent standards of basic values. *“If we want to complete the democratization process, we need to have a better consensus on our vision and the meaning of basic values”*, Yeh said.

Her daughter Chu-mei, who was 10 years old when her father passed away, now lives and works in Tainan. She said that her father had been a person who had respect for life, loved life and was enthusiastic about life. She said that her father had encouraged her to think independently.

In response to the history teacher, she said: *“We live on the same island. We need to understand each other better, so we can have a better future.”* She invited history professor Wang and other faculty members of National Cheng Kung University to visit the museum in Taipei dedicated to her father and his struggle for freedom of expression. She added: *“Life is precious, we shall never give it up easily. Neither did my father.”*

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## **Re-writing Taiwan’s history**

### ***Education task force “de-Taiwanizing” curriculum***

On 27 January 2014, Taiwan’s Ministry of Education approved a number of changes in textbooks for the literature and social sciences curriculum proposed by a task force set up by the Ministry. The proposed changes provoked immediate protests from professionals in the field of history and other social sciences.

The task force, headed by National Taiwan University professor Wang Hsiao-po, had said that the changes were “slight adjustments” in high-school text books, but critics

countered that the amendments amounted to a major effort at “de-Taiwanization” and constituted an attempt to instill the students with a “greater China” historical perspective.

Examples of the changes that were proposed by the task force and immediately approved by the Ministry:

Photo: Taipei Times

- \* The rule by Cheng Chen-kung and his successors (1662-1683) should from now on be referred to as “the Cheng family rule *under the Ming dynasty*”, making it appear as if Taiwan was already ruled by China at the time. In reality Cheng was a renegade pirate who fled to Taiwan after the Ch’ing dynasty took power in Beijing in 1644. The Ming were long gone when Cheng ruled Taiwan.



**Students and faculty protest textbook changes outside Ministry of Education in Taipei**

- \* The era of Japanese rule (1895-1945) should now be referred to as “Japanese *colonial period*”, much more strongly emphasizing the colonial character than before.
- \* The events in 1945 and 1949 should now be referred to as “glorious retrocession” and “relocation of the government to Taiwan” emphasizing a *continuity* between the KMT’s existence in China and its move to Taiwan, while in fact that was a major dislocation and discontinuity for both the Chinese Nationalists as well as for the Taiwanese population that inhabited Taiwan already.
- \* “China” should from now on only be referred to as “mainland China”, signifying that the term “China” does not refer to the PRC but only an area under the ROC Constitution.

In an interesting twist, Greater Tainan Mayor William Lai, who is a member of the DPP, announced on January 29<sup>th</sup> that his city and surrounding county will not adopt the revised curriculum, and will keep the current outlines. Lai also said it was peculiar that these changes come only two years after a previous set of changes. The legally mandated normal interval between such changes in the curriculum is six years.

A few days later, on 5 February 2014, the DPP announced that all six of the cities and counties administered by elected DPP officials would refuse to implement the new texts proposed by the Ministry of Education. The DPP Caucus in the Legislative Yuan also announced that they would strongly urge the Ministry to rescind the proposals, which it considered “illegitimate” and presenting an “erroneous” historical perception.

However, on 10 February 2014, the Ministry of Education formally approved the changes. On the next day, the Democratic Progressive Party filed a complaint with the Control Yuan over the changes, saying it was an attempt at “de-Taiwanization and sinicization.” DPP deputy secretary-general Lee Chun-yi, together with spokesperson Lin Chun-hsien and several other officials submitted a formal document to the Control Yuan, listing five formal complaints about the ministry’s handling of the matter.

### ***Protests against revisionist changes in text books***

The changes by the Ministry of Education also prompted a number of street protests. On January 23<sup>rd</sup> and again on January 27<sup>th</sup> 2014 a coalition of organizations, including the Union of Taiwanese Teachers and the Alliance of Referendum for Taiwan gathered outside the Ministry of Education to express their opposition to the changes.

Critics of the move included Taiwan History Association chairman Tsai Ching-tung and professor Jim Lee of National Taipei University of Education’s Graduate School of Taiwanese Culture. Dr. Tsai questioned the fact that several of the members of the task force were known as ardent unificationists. He pointed in particular to Fo Guang University professor Hsieh Ta-ning, who doubles as secretary-general of the Chinese Integration Association.

Professor Lee stated that the changes constitute a “*fundamental and dramatic change from a Taiwan-oriented to a China-oriented perspective in education.*” He added: *Taiwanese have fought long and hard to reach a stage where there is much less political influence on our education, so it is therefore unacceptable that the government under the leadership of President Ma Ying-jeou is making a U-turn on this progress.*”

Another scholar, Fu Jen University history professor Chen Chun-kai, also criticized the lack of consultation on the matter. He accused the Ministry of conducting a “sneak attack” by holding a couple of public hearings at short notice, and not informing the people in the field of history who are directly involved in teaching these topics.

Former Academia Historica president Chang Yen-hsien also criticized the changes, saying they artificially tried to rebuild the historical connection between Taiwan and China, and ignored Taiwan's identity and diverse cultures.

Copyright: Taipei Times

In an editorial, the **Taipei Times** on 30 January 2014 termed the move as “New attempts at brainwashing”, and added that the outlook of the Ma administration “...ignores the Taiwanese awareness that has developed over the past two decades.” The editorial stated that the government apparently hopes that the changes will restore the Chiang-era goal of retaking the mainland” but that these are “unrealistic and out of step with public expectations.”



**The Ma administration's "textbook revisions" witch manipulating the brains of school kids**

And on 5 February 2014, several dozens of civics and social studies teachers from the Civics Teachers Action Alliance demonstrated outside the Ministry of Education, urging it to halt implementation of the new curriculum and restart the consultation process, which in their view had violated established consultation mechanisms.

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## **Being clear on Taiwan**

### ***Threading the needle, roiling the waters, drawing a big red line***

Over the past few months there have been several articles suggesting adjustments to US policy towards Taiwan and China. Some of these proposed 1) *a trade-off by which the US would attempt to enhance relations with China by limiting or reducing support for Taiwan.* Others went in the opposite direction and suggest 2) *a firmer approach, which makes it clear to China that any use of military power to resolve differences will be met with strong opposition from the United States.*

In the first category we count a recent report titled *Threading the Needle; Proposals for U.S. and Chinese Actions on Arms Sales to Taiwan* by David Firestein at the **East-West Center** in Hawaii. The report was published in September 2013, and was presented at a seminar at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington on 14 January 2014.

The major recommendation in this report was that the US would *unilaterally* set a voluntary annual cap on US arms deliveries to Taiwan in accordance with the 1982 Communiqué. In return, Beijing should “*unilaterally, voluntarily, and verifiably*” reduce its missile force facing Taiwan. However, the proposal was shot down almost immediately by Washington insiders, including Richard Bush of the **Brookings Institution**, who said the danger of setting a cap on arms sales was that it could become a “hard ceiling” instead of a “floating average.”

A second proposal in the first category was made by George Washington University professor Amitai Etzioni, who in an article in **The Diplomat** suggested that the US and China should make explicit a presumably implicit understanding that as long as China does not use force to coerce Taiwan, the US would continue to refrain from treating Taiwan as an independent state (*The benefits of being clear on Taiwan*, 17 January 2014). This proposal is strongly rebutted by former **American Institute in Taiwan** chairman Nat Bellocchi, see below.

Two other proposals fall into the second category: that of a firmer approach towards China. In a 21 January 2014 article in **Foreign Policy**, Elbridge Colby and Ely Ratner argue that China’s recent regional provocations in the East and South China Seas amount to an expansionist strategy, with profound implications for US power and regional security.

Colby and Ratner propose that the US must demonstrate a willingness to push back militarily when China attempts to coerce America’s allies and partners in the region. It needs to “*stop playing the peacemaker and start making China feel uncomfortable*” (*Roiling the waters*, **Foreign Policy**, 21 January 2014).

An argument along similar lines was made by former Pentagon official Joseph A. Bosco who stated in an article in **The National Interest** that US allies in the region need better assurances on security in the region, and that the US should “*draw a red line across the Asia Pacific region in response to China’s threats of force in the Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea, and the East China Sea. The line would also transverse the Korean Peninsula at the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel*” (*Draw a big red line in Asia*, 5 February 2014).

## *US must be clear on core values*

*By Nat Bellocchi. Ambassador Bellocchi served as Chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan from 1990 through 1995. This article was first published in the Taipei Times on 27 January 2014. Reprinted with permission.*

A couple of years ago, George Washington University (GWU) professor Charles Glaser wrote an essay in *Foreign Affairs*, titled “*Will China’s Rise Lead to War?*” in which he said that the US should back away from its commitments to Taiwan in order to avoid a conflict with a rising China.

Copyright: Taipei Times

In an article in the Taipei Times, I rebutted Glaser, showing that his arguments were ill-founded (“*Charles Glaser’s fallacious arguments*,” March 7, 2011, page 8). History now seems to repeat itself: Two weeks ago, GWU professor Amitai Etzioni made many of the same arguments as Glaser.



### **Taiwan is a key link in the First Island Chain**

In a Jan. 17 article in **The Diplomat** titled “*The Benefits of Being Clear on Taiwan*,” Etzioni said that the US and

China should arrive at an explicit understanding “*that as long as China does not use force to coerce Taiwan, ... the US would continue to refrain from treating Taiwan as an independent state.*”

Whether such an implicit understanding exists is unclear: In the article, Etzioni presents the responses of eight experts, and only one of them said there is such an understanding. That seems to be a rather feeble basis for an academic argument, let alone for a new policy.

Like Glaser before him, Etzioni does not have a background in East Asian policy issues. While he is a highly respected sociologist, it would have been better had he considered a number of points that are essential to a thorough understanding of the situation.

The first drawback in his reasoning is in the very beginning of his article, where he argues that “*the way Taiwan is treated is currently a much less pressing issue than settling the differences about the status of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands and ... the South China Sea.*” The key point here is that — together with the Senkaku Islands [as they are known in Japan] and South China Sea — gaining control of Taiwan is a core element in China’s grand strategy to expand its military influence in the Western Pacific. They cannot be separated out as unrelated issues.

In fact, Taiwan is a key link in the first island chain, which ties together democratic nations in the region, extending itself from South Korea and Japan via Taiwan to the south. It is thus not about Taiwan itself, but its strategic location.

The second flaw is that Etzioni seems to suggest that the US should make a deal with China over the heads of the Taiwanese. That would not be in line with the nation’s democratic principles, and actually a repeat of dismal earlier actions by the US. After World War II, the Taiwanese were — without being asked — subjected to a military rule by the losing side of the Chinese Civil War. Chiang Kai-shek’s position became increasingly weak by the early 1970s, and the US subsequently had to recognize Beijing as the government of China.

In their haste to normalize relations with Beijing, former US presidents Richard Nixon and Jimmy Carter failed to consult the people of Taiwan, but fortunately, the US Congress overwhelmingly passed the Taiwan Relations Act, maintaining a semblance of relations with the island and its people.

Etzioni therefore needs to take into account that in the late 1980s, Taiwan made a momentous transition to democracy. The people on the island are now free to express their views, and the large majority consider themselves Taiwanese instead of Chinese. His view would again sell Taiwan down the river.

The Shanghai Communiqué clause stating that “all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China” has become rather irrelevant: In the latest Taiwan opinion poll, 78.1 percent of those polled said they are Taiwanese, while 12.3 percent identified as Chinese (“*Independence beats ‘status quo’ in poll,*” Dec. 31, 2013, page 1). A large majority does not consider Taiwan to be part of the PRC. (“*Taiwanese identity stays strong: poll,*” Aug. 13, 2013, page 3).

The US indeed needs to be crystal-clear on Taiwan: It needs to support the right of the Taiwanese to determine their future. If their choice is that they want to be accepted by

the international community as a free and democratic nation, the US needs to respect and support that choice. This would be in line with the country's values and the principle of self-determination as enshrined in the UN Charter.

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## In Memoriam Dr. Chai Trong-rong

*By Mark Kao, PhD, President, Formosan Association for Public Affairs*

January 11<sup>th</sup> 2014 was a sad day for all of us at FAPA, a sad day for Taiwan's democracy and independence movement and a sad day for Taiwan. It was the day that Dr. Chai Trong-rong, one of Taiwan's foremost advocates of democracy and independence, fell.

Photo: Taipei Times

Dr. Chai had suffered a stroke on 18 December 2013, and was hospitalized and in a coma since then. Just after midnight, in the early morning of 11 January 2014 he passed away.

Dr. Trong Chai, as we called him, was born in 1935, came to the United States in the early 1960s for his studies, and received his Ph.D. from the University of Southern California. He soon became a professor of political science at the City University of New York.



**Dr. Chai Trong-rong (1935-2014)**

During his student days he already became politically active, speaking out for democracy in Taiwan, which was suffering under the martial law of the regime of Chiang Kai-shek and later his son Chiang Ching-kuo. This prompted the Taipei regime to put him on the blacklist, so he was unable to return to Taiwan for some 20 years.

During these years he was instrumental in setting up the World United Formosans for Independence in 1970, and our own Formosan Association for Public Affairs in 1982. He subsequently served as President of both organizations.

After Taiwan's momentous transition to democracy in the early 1990s he returned to Taiwan and was elected a member of the Legislative Yuan for the DPP between 1993 and 2008, representing his hometown of Chiayi. He also promoted democracy by founding the Association for a Plebiscite in Taiwan.

In the meantime, he also helped break the Kuomintang's authoritarian control of the media by establishing a fourth television channel, Formosa TV in 1996. FTV is now one of Taiwan's major news channels.

Many of us at FAPA carry a special place in our hearts for Dr. Chai, for he was one of the founding fathers of FAPA and became its first president in 1982. In recent years, whenever he would be in the US he would make sure to pay FAPA HQ a visit and he would get reacquainted with old friends on Capitol Hill. Indeed, Chai won the respect of members of the United States Congress for his determination and conviction to make Taiwan a better place. That is his greatest legacy.

It should come as no surprise that he promoted inter-parliamentary exchanges between Taiwan and other democratic countries such as the United States by founding the Taiwan Inter-Parliamentary Amity Association (TIAA) in the Legislative Yuan and served as its first president.

Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen stated upon hearing the news of Chai's passing: "*Dr. Chai was a patriot and true leader of the people of Taiwan and a familiar face to many of us on Capitol Hill [...] We will all miss his talent and dedication to fighting for a free and democratic society on behalf of the people of his beloved Taiwan.*"

Chairman of the House Asian Subcommittee Steve Chabot added: "*He was a good friend and a great Taiwanese patriot. Those of us in the Congress who advocate for the cause of Taiwanese freedom will miss him greatly.*"

On January 11<sup>th</sup> 2014, a great Taiwanese life came to an end. Dr. Chai's journey has ended; a long and eventful trip that helped shape Taiwan's democracy.

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## **Book Review: The Vitality of Taiwan *Politics, Economics, Society and Culture***

*Edited by Steve Tsang. Review by Gerrit van der Wees*


This book grew out of a workshop at St. Anthony's College, Oxford University in June 2010. Editor Steve Tsang served as dean and director of the Asian Studies Centre there at the time. He has since moved to the University of Nottingham.

The major theme of the book is the vibrancy and vitality of so many aspects of society, that has characterized Taiwan's society since the end of the Kuomintang's Martial Law in 1987. In many ways, this book is a corollary to David Blundell's **Taiwan Since Martial Law**, which we reviewed in *Taiwan Communiqué* no. 141 (April/May 2013).

Steve Tsang was able to bring together a group of noted Taiwan scholars, including Mark Harrison of the University of Tasmania, Michael Hsiao of the Academia Sinica, Gary Rawnsley of the University of Leeds, Lin Pei-yin at the University of Cambridge, Gunter Schubert of the University of Tuebingen, and Joseph Wong of the University of Toronto.

In the introduction Tsang not only introduces the main theme of the book and highlights the individual chapters, but also makes a number of more general points that are worth remembering when discussing Taiwan.

The first one is that while the legacy of Sinicization imposed by Chiang Kai-shek during the post-War decades still looms large, as time goes by Taiwan's democratization and national identity has taken on more and more local characteristics. He writes: *In the era of democracy defining the identity of Taiwan is .... A prerogative of its people, to be agreed upon through the democratic process in due course.*



A second point Tsang makes is that in spite of the easing of tension and enmity across the Taiwan Strait after president Ma came to power in 2008, the PRC will be unable and unwilling to tolerate a democracy on its doorstep. Writes Tsang: *... whether it will or can tolerate a genuine and vibrant democracy like Taiwan to exist within the framework of a united China is highly questionable.*

Tsang adds: *As long as the political system in the PRC remains basically the same, the CCP will not and indeed cannot afford to tolerate a vibrant democracy within*

*its national jurisdiction, whatever the terms of a deal it may make with Taiwan for unification.*

The other authors describe, each in their own field, how the society broke through the vestiges of the old authoritarian regime, and brought about a dynamism, exuberance and creativity that was unheard of just a couple of decades ago.

In his chapter on *Social Foundations of Political Vitality*, Michael Hsiao does an excellent job in describing how civil society evolved from the authoritarian era to 2011, detailing how it keeps the democratic system robust through its constant scrutiny.

A particularly interesting essay is also Lin Pei-yin's *Literature's role in breaching the authoritarian mindset*, on how "nativist" literature was a key factor in pushing back against the imposition of Chineseness by the KMT during the Martial Law era, and was subsequently instrumental in developing new Taiwanese cultural and national identity.

Mark Harrison paints the importance of democratization on cultural life, and shows how in film and literature there has been an explosion of artistic expression that focuses on Taiwan's own identity and history, as opposed to the sino-centric approach brought over by the Chinese Nationalists and imposed on society during the Martial Law years.

Gary Rawnsley and his co-writer Sarah Gong do an excellent survey of the role of the media in monitoring Taiwan's democracy. They interview a number of journalists and politicians and go into the different roles played in nurturing Taiwan's nascent democracy.

There are several other good chapters, including Guenther Schubert's analysis of the *Taishang* (Taiwanese businessmen in China) and their role in both the economy and political system.

In all, a very valuable contribution to the understanding of where Taiwan came from, and where its people want to go ... with gusto, enthusiasm, and vitality.

The full title of the book is: **The Vitality of Taiwan: Politics, Economics, Society and Culture**, edited by Steve Tsang, professor of Professor of Contemporary Chinese Studies & Director of the China Policy Institute, University of Nottingham, Great Britain. Palgrave MacMillan, Hampshire, Great Britain, 2012.

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*The goals of FAPA are: 1) to promote international support for the right of the people of Taiwan (Formosa) to establish an independent and democratic country, and to join the international community; 2) to advance the rights and interests of Taiwanese communities throughout the world; and 3) to promote peace and security for Taiwan*

Internet homepages: [www.fapa.org](http://www.fapa.org) and [www.taiwandc.org](http://www.taiwandc.org)

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